RETALIATORY CONSTITUTIONALIZATION

NUCLEAR COMMAND, CONSTITUTIONAL ENTRENCHMENT, AND CRISIS ESCALATION

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54934/ijlcw.v5i1.184

Keywords:

retaliatory constitutionalization, nuclear command and control, international nuclear law, emergency powers, artificial intelligence, constitucionalización de las represalias, mando y control nuclear, derecho nuclear internacional, poderes de emergencia, inteligencia artificial, 报复性宪法化, 核指挥与控制, 国际核法, 紧急权力, 人工智能

Abstract

Retaliatory Constitutionalization Theory explains how states may elevate nuclear command and retaliatory commitments from ordinary policy into constitutional or quasi-constitutional form. Drawing on comparative constitutional law, international nuclear law, command-and-control studies, and AI-governance debates, the article argues that this movement becomes more likely where existential threat perception, decapitation anxiety, executive personalization, and weak internal veto points converge. It introduces two exploratory qualitative measures, the Nuclear Constitutionalization Index and the Retaliatory Constitutionalization Score, and applies them to a 45-jurisdiction comparative map. North Korea appears as the paradigmatic case; Russia, Pakistan, Belarus, and anti-nuclear constitutional states operate as contrasting comparators. The article concludes that contemporary nuclear law remains stronger at regulating possession, transfer, testing, and disarmament than decision, delegation, automation, command survival, and constitutional signalling.

__________

CONSTITUCIONALIZACIÓN DE LAS REPRESALIAS: MANDO NUCLEAR, BLINDAJE CONSTITUCIONAL Y ESCALADA DE CRISIS

La teoría de la constitucionalización de las represalias explica cómo los Estados pueden elevar el mando nuclear y los compromisos de represalia desde el ámbito de la política ordinaria a una forma constitucional o cuasiconstitucional. A partir del derecho constitucional comparado, el derecho nuclear internacional, los estudios sobre mando y control y los debates sobre la gobernanza de la IA, el artículo sostiene que esta tendencia es más probable cuando convergen la percepción de una amenaza existencial, el temor a un ataque de decapitación, la personalización del poder ejecutivo y la debilidad de los mecanismos internos de veto. Se introducen dos medidas cualitativas exploratorias —el Índice de Constitucionalización Nuclear y la Puntuación de Constitucionalización de las Represalias— y se aplican en un análisis comparativo que abarca 45 jurisdicciones. Corea del Norte figura como el caso paradigmático, mientras que Rusia, Pakistán, Bielorrusia y los Estados con disposiciones constitucionales antinucleares sirven como términos de comparación. El artículo concluye que el derecho nuclear contemporáneo sigue siendo más eficaz a la hora de regular la posesión, la transferencia, las pruebas y el desarme que en lo relativo a la toma de decisiones, la delegación, la automatización, la supervivencia del mando y la señalización constitucional.

__________

复性法化:核指法固化与危机升

“报复性宪法化”理论阐释了国家如何将核指挥与报复承诺从一般性政策提升为宪法或准宪法层面的规范。本文综合比较宪法学、国际核法、指挥与控制研究以及人工智能治理领域的探讨,指出当生存威胁感知、对“斩首”打击的焦虑、行政权高度个人化以及国内制衡机制(否决点)薄弱等因素交织时,这种宪法化趋势便更易出现。文章提出了“核宪法化指数”和“报复性宪法化评分”这两项探索性定性指标,并将其应用于涵盖45个司法管辖区的比较分析中。其中,朝鲜被视为典型案例;俄罗斯、巴基斯坦、白俄罗斯以及将“无核”写入宪法的国家则作为对照组进行分析。文章最后得出结论:当代核法在规制核武器的拥有、转让、试验及裁军方面较为有力,但在规制核决策、授权、自动化、指挥体系生存能力及宪法信号传递等方面,则相对薄弱。

Author Biography

Thiago Perez Bernardes de Moraes, Centro Universitário Campos de Andrade

PhD and Post-doctorate in Social Psychology from the Universidad Argentina John Fitzgerald Kennedy, and Post-doctorate in Constitutional Law from the Università degli Studi di Messina. Full Professor and Institutional Outreach Coordinator at Centro Universitário Campos de Andrade (UNIANDRADE). Coordinator of Pedagogical Projects at Instituto EDUTEA.

References

Abdelkarim, Y. A. (2024). A multi-dimensional approach to impose universal jurisdiction in international legal practice. International Journal of Law in Changing World, 3(1), 21-52. https://doi.org/10.54934/ijlcw.v3i1.87

Bernstein, P. I., & Smith, S. (2022, November 14). Through a glass, a little less darkly: North Korean nuclear command and control in light of recent developments. 38 North. https://www.38north.org/2022/11/through-a-glass-a-little-less-darkly-north-korean-nuclear-command-and-control-in-light-of-recent-developments/

Blair, B. G. (1985). Strategic command and control: Redefining the nuclear threat. Brookings Institution.

Carter, A. B., Steinbruner, J. D., & Zraket, C. A. (Eds.). (1987). Managing nuclear operations. Brookings Institution.

Cheong, W.-S. (2023). The DPRK's changed nuclear doctrine. Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 6(1), 31-49. https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2023.2188859

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. (2026). Status of signatures and ratifications. https://www.ctbto.org/our-mission/states-signatories

Constitute Project. (2026). Constitutional texts database. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitutions

Feaver, P. D. (1992). Guarding the guardians: Civilian control of nuclear weapons in the United States. Cornell University Press.

Ginsburg, T., & Simpser, A. (Eds.). (2014). Constitutions in authoritarian regimes. Cambridge University Press.

International Atomic Energy Agency. (2026). The IAEA and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. https://www.iaea.org/topics/non-proliferation-treaty

International Committee of the Red Cross. (2022). The ICRC's legal and policy position on nuclear weapons. International Review of the Red Cross, 104(919), 1081-1107.

Ivan, D. L., & Manea, T. (2022). AI use in criminal matters as permitted under EU law and as needed to safeguard the essence of fundamental rights. International Journal of Law in Changing World, 1(1), 17-32. https://doi.org/10.54934/ijlcw.v1i1.15

Kim, J., Park, J. H., & Reddy, S. (2026, May 7). North Korea's amended constitution redefines borders and rejects reunification. ConstitutionNet. https://constitutionnet.org/news/north-koreas-amended-constitution-redefines-borders-and-rejects-reunification

Korean Central News Agency. (2022, September 9). Law on DPRK's policy on nuclear forces promulgated. KCNA Watch. https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1662687258-950776986/law-on-dprks-policy-on-nuclear-forces-promulgated/

Kristensen, H. M., Korda, M., Johns, E., & Knight, M. (2024). North Korean nuclear weapons, 2024. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 80(4), 251-271. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2024.2365013

Landau, D. (2013). Abusive constitutionalism. UC Davis Law Review, 47(1), 189-260.

Lee, R. M., Oh, G. S., Mimura, M., & Han, K. (2026, March 25). Expert takes on opening session of the 15th Supreme People's Assembly. 38 North. https://www.38north.org/2026/03/expert-takes-on-opening-session-of-the-15th-supreme-peoples-assembly/

New Zealand Parliamentary Counsel Office. (1987). New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987. https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1987/86/en/latest/

Nuclear Threat Initiative. (2026a). Belarus: Nuclear disarmament. https://www.nti.org/countries/belarus/

Nuclear Threat Initiative. (2026b). North Korea: Nuclear. https://www.nti.org/countries/north-korea/

Nuclear Threat Initiative. (2026c). South Africa: Nuclear. https://www.nti.org/countries/south-africa/

Nuclear Threat Initiative. (2026d). Ukraine: Nuclear disarmament. https://www.nti.org/countries/ukraine/

Prakash, S. (2023). Deciphering the Commander-in-Chief Clause. Yale Law Journal, 133(1), 1-70.

Sagan, S. D. (1994). The perils of proliferation: Organization theory, deterrence theory, and the spread of nuclear weapons. International Security, 18(4), 66-107. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539178

Srivastava, K. (2023). Artificial intelligence and national security: Perspective of the Global South. International Journal of Law in Changing World, 2(2), 77-87. https://doi.org/10.54934/ijlcw.v2i2.63

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2024). Nuclear weapons and artificial intelligence. SIPRI. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2024-09/bp_2409_ai-nuclear.pdf

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2025). Impact of military artificial intelligence on nuclear escalation. SIPRI. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-06/2025_6_ai_and_nuclear_risk.pdf

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2025). SIPRI Yearbook 2025: Armaments, disarmament and international security. SIPRI. https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2025

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. (2026a). Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). https://disarmament.unoda.org/en/our-work/weapons-mass-destruction/nuclear-weapons/treaty-non-proliferation-nuclear-weapons

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. (2026b). Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. https://disarmament.unoda.org/en/our-work/weapons-mass-destruction/nuclear-weapons/treaty-prohibition-nuclear-weapons

Published

2026-07-30

How to Cite

Perez Bernardes de Moraes, T. (2026). RETALIATORY CONSTITUTIONALIZATION: NUCLEAR COMMAND, CONSTITUTIONAL ENTRENCHMENT, AND CRISIS ESCALATION. International Journal of Law in Changing World, 5(1), 170–188. https://doi.org/10.54934/ijlcw.v5i1.184